



















Decentralisation in France: The »Jacobin« 




             323.172(44)
Izvorni znanstveni rad (original scientific paper) 
Primljeno:  21. 2. 2011.
Prihva!eno:  7. 6. 2011.
France has traditionally been regarded as having one of 
the most centralised public administrations in the world. 
The consequences of decentralisation at the local level in 
France (départements, communes) are analysed and contrast-
ed with the pursued reform objectives. After a brief review 
of the most important characteristics of the »tamed Jaco-
binism«, the motives, political debates, and expectations 
associated with the reforms and their major elements are 
extrapolated upon by concentrating on the second round 
of decentralisation, which began in 2003 (Acte II). The im-
pacts and effects of decentralisation are scrutinised by dis-
tinguishing between operational results and far-reaching 
system effects. In order to reveal the former, it is asked if 
the objective of the French government, faire mieux avec 
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moins (doing better with less), has been obtained. Explor-
ing the latter, the changes in the system with regard to ver-
tical power sharing, coordination practices between local 
and state actors, and actual decision-making in an inter-
governmental setting are analysed. 
Key words: decentralisation – France, »Jacobin« state, lo-
cal government, state and administrative reform, vertical 
power sharing, better with less
1. Introduction
Decentralisation of public functions and competencies to the lower lev-
els of government has become one of the most prominent trends of mo-
dernisation in both young democracies and countries with longstanding 
democratic traditions (see Goldsmith, 2003: 117; Goldsmith and Page, 
2010; Denters and Rose, 2005; Hoffmann-Martinot, 2006: 231; Brusis, 
2010; Swianiewicz, 2010). Furthermore, decentralisation policies are evi-
dence of an international trend in political and administrative reform.1 
France, when compared with other European countries, has traditionally 
been considered a highly centralised state. Thus, the reforms that began 
in the 1980s offer a particularly persuasive example of decentralisation 
policy (Le Lidec, 2007; Thoenig, 2005; Cole, 2006; Kuhlmann, 2009a, 
2009b). The following contribution will assess the effects and impacts 
of this process focusing on the two decentralisation acts (Acte I and Acte 
II). This analytical perspective is justified by the fact that the effects and 
impacts of institutional reforms are still largely understudied in compara-
tive public administration. In general public administration theory, the 
hypothesised outcomes of decentralisation policies are twofold. Firstly, 
they are expected to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the fulfilment 
of public tasks; and secondly, they are assumed to increase the democratic 
accountability of public services (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 105–106; 
Lockwood, 2008: 33). Yet, as we have hardly any empirical knowledge 
about the impact of decentralisation on the actual functioning of local in-
stitutions and the achieved performance changes (Wollmann and Bouck-
1  The exception to the rule is Great Britain. Here, the process of de-concentrating 
central government administration through agencies had the reverse effect on local govern-
ment. Goldsmith, 2003: 118; Kuhlmann et al., 2011.
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aert, 2006), premature generalisations should be avoided. Against this 
backdrop, the paper aims at adopting an analytical perspective that moves 
away from the predominant approach of explaining institutional changes 
(what shapes institutions?) and will rather emphasise the effects of in-
stitutional reforms (how and why do institutions / institutional policies 
matter?). The findings can help to address some of the pressing concerns 
of decentralisation policies in France and thereby contribute to filling a 
research lacuna that has hitherto existed in public administration. The fol-
lowing questions will form the central part of the analysis: 
(1)  How can we approach the question of reform impacts analyti-
cally, from an evaluative perspective? 
(2)  What have been the starting conditions of the reforms and which 
institutional changes have taken place over the course of two 
waves of decentralisation in France? 
(3)  What impact has decentralisation had on the performance of 
local governments (performance effects: input and output chan-
ges) and on the coordination and decision-making in the inter-
governmental system (system changes)? 
(4)  In light of the changes that have occurred in the French politi-
co-administrative system, can we speak of a real »transforma-
tion« or even of an »end of the indivisible Republic«?2
2. Analytical Framework: Decentralisation as 
Institutional Policy
When assessing the effects of institutional changes the relevant studies on 
public sector reform offer an appropriate conceptual starting point. The 
paper draws on an analytical framework that was suggested for the evalu-
ation of institutional reforms resulting from the international New Public 
Management (NPM) movement (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Kuhlmann 
et al., 2008). According to this evaluative framework, the impacts of insti-
tutional reforms must be analysed in three steps: 
2  The paper will focus on local self-government at the municipal level (communes) and 
at the level of departments (départements). The regions are left aside to a large extent.
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(1)  First, the initial conditions before the reforms and institutio-
nal changes that occur within the politico-administrative system 
must be analysed. This is referred to as institutional evaluation. 
(2)  The second step will look at the effects of these institutional chan-
ges on the performance of institutions, which can be label led as 
performance evaluation. Here, an analytical distinction must be 
made between input effects on the one hand (use of resources, 
costs and savings) and output effects on the other (scope of ser-
vices, service quality etc.)3 Accordingly, performance effects can 
be measured by increases in efficiency and reduction of costs and 
also by the range and quality of services provided. 
(3)  In the third step, the broader effects of institutional policies on 
coordination, steering, and multi-level decision-making are taken 
into consideration (system changes). Here, the analytical empha-
sis is placed on the changes in interaction between the different 
administrative levels and on the new balancing of intergovernmen-
tal relations between the central state and the local governments. 
The capacities of vertical and horizontal coordination, on the one 
hand, and democratic control and political accountability, on the 
other, will all be measured as variables of system changes.
3.  Initial Conditions Prior to Reform and 
Institutional Changes
According to the analytical framework, the first step is to consider the 
initial conditions of decentralisation reform and the institutional changes 
that occurred due to decentralisation policies, which will provide a bench-
mark for the subsequent evaluation. 
3.1.  Initial Conditions of Decentralisation
Traditionally, the local authorities (collectivités locales) – regions, départe-
ments and municipalities – are regarded as being part of the »indivisible 
3  In their analysis of operational results, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) included the 
measurements of productivity ratios and outcome/impact. The latter concept will be examined 
in this paper under system changes.
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republic« in France (une et indivisible). The central state, according to the 
constitution, has the sovereignty (Hoffmann-Martinot, 2006: 231 f.) and 
can autonomously decide on the form and functions of the sub-national 
levels. Rooted in the Jacobin-Napoleonic tradition of »executive centra-
lism« (Wollmann, 1999: 193–198) that dates back to the nineteenth cen-
tury, the French local government system remained under the aegis of 
the governmental prefects who exercised a rigid a priori supervisory and 
legal control (tutelle) until the 1980s. Due to lack of institutional resour-
ces, local governments transferred many of their tasks to the state level 
and took on a rather marginal role in the administrative system. Although 
some changes and refining of the Jacobin state had taken place before the 
1980s, the responsibilities of local governments remained restricted be-
cause the small size of the territorial municipalities (37,000 councils with 
an average of 1,600 citizens) proved to be a hindrance to their functional 
strengths. The traditional French administrative system can be characte-
rized as a »state-administrative integrated model«, in the sense that local 
self-government responsibilities and state-administered tasks were both 
organised and arranged within the (de-concentrated) field offices of the 
central state (Wollmann, 1999: 196).
The French system paints a picture of a powerful central state that has 
control over the entire institutional system at the sub-national level. In 
practice, however, the »tamed Jacobinism« (jacobinisme apprivoisé; Grémi-
on, 1976) has long since pointed toward a system of »informal decentra-
lisation« (Mabileau, 1996: 25 ff.). Due to widespread practice of holding 
multiple offices (cumul des mandats), which allowed »local notables« to 
extend and exercise their power beyond the realm of local policy, local 
executives have had considerable influence on the higher levels of go-
vernment and, to a large extent, on the national level. This is not only 
made apparent by the policy-making of the national legislator, where 50 
per cent of the members of parliament are mayors (Hoffmann-Martinot, 
2003: 166 ff.), but also by the actual veto power wielded by the Sénat, 
which primarily represents those who are against modernisation and the 
conservative interests of local executives. These aspects of formal and 
informal decentralisation ensure that national laws that are against the 
will of local authorities cannot normally be adopted. Furthermore, policy 
implementation at the local level is conducted through a tight collabora-
tion between the state (through prefects and special de-concentrated state 
agencies) and local government actors. In this sense, decisions are made 
on the basis of consensus and through negotiations, rather than through a 
hierarchical chain of command. Even before the wave of decentralisation, 
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the traditionally strict state supervision under the prefects had been molli-
fied and reduced to such a degree that it was solely symbolic (Mabileau, 
1996; Thoenig, 2005). Moreover, many of the field offices of the central 
state, in practice, had actually advocated local interests and projects in 
lieu of national policy interest (Thoenig, 2005). An additional catalyst 
in the movement towards decentralisation was a lack of personnel in the 
Parisian ministerial government. Thus, the government in Paris found it-
self increasingly strained and poorly positioned to coordinate and control 
the multiple decentralised field offices of the central state spread out all 
over the country, which resulted in the questioning of institutional effec-
tiveness of the latter. Integration of the central and local powers, which 
has been referred to as the »colonialisation« of the centre by local actors 
(Hesse and Sharpe, 1991), has paved the way for decentralised and locali-
sed policy-making, whereby local actors can influence the national agenda 
through the process of »uplifting«. Due to the fact that sub-national and 
local actors are able to influence, if not determine, the extent and bre-
adth of policy, particularly with regard to locally important institutional 
matters, the chance of implementing nationally defined reform programs 
in a top-down manner remains limited. For this purpose, the politics of 
decentralisation in France offers a perfect illustration of this pattern. 
3.2.  Institutional Changes: The Two Waves of 
Decentralisation
The decentralisation movement in France can be divided into two stages. 
Acte I began in the 1980s under the socialist government of Lois Defferre 
(Balligand and Zeller, 2006; Schmidt, 1990; Kuhlmann, 2009a, 2009b). 
The second wave (Acte II) took place in the 1990s and was finalized by 
the constitutional reform in March 2003. It will be the focal point of the 
analysis throughout this paper. Article 1 of the French constitution states 
that »the organisation of the republic is decentralised«4 and it is precisely 
this that shows the important constitutional status that decentralisation is 
given as a high order national policy. The introduction of a kind of subsidi-
ary principle creates a new trend unfamiliar to the »indivisible republic«.
The same can also be said for the introduction of so-called experimental 
policy. This new type of policy is yet another characteristic of the trend of 
4  »... son organisation est décentralisée« (Lois constitutionnelle no. 2003–276 du 28 
mars 2003 relative à l’organisation décentralisée de la République).
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moving away from the idea that the republic is united and indivisible to 
the one where the state is variable and vertically fragmented. However, 
the Acte II reform primarily brought in new competencies and resources 
solely for the départements and regions; whereas municipalities and inter-
municipal cooperation bodies (établissements de coopération intercommunale 
– EPCI) were largely neglected (at least until the Sarkozy’s presidency; 
particularly the Balladur report of 2009; Comité Balladur, 2009; Kuhlmann, 
2010). In the 1990s and again in 2008 (Rapport Attali, 2008) the future 
of the départements was speculated about, and the idea of abolishing this 
level of local government was put forward, even though their functional 
role and responsibilities were significantly expanded under Acte II. The 
institutional level of the départements appears to be secure, at least for the 
foreseeable future. With this in mind, lobby groups for the municipalities 
and larger cities have criticised Acte II, charging that is has resulted in 
departmental and regional re-centralisation (Portier, 2003: 62). 
The complete »departementalisation« of the RMI (revenue minimum 
d’inser tion), which is a minimal income scheme designed to reintegrate 
those who have been unemployed for a long time back into the labour 
market, contributed to a significant functional strengthening of the gene-
ral councils. The transfer of RMI and the bundling of labour-marked rela-
ted sub-national functions can be regarded as an important step towards 
a territorially integrated local welfare policy at the department level. They 
are not only responsible for designing, coordinating and implementing 
measures to reintegrate the unemployed into the labour market but also 
for financing the relevant services and payments. Yet, on the flipside lies 
a growing financial burden on the départements and an increased invol-
vement in the execution of nationally defined policies, which leaves less 
room for the execution of local and voluntary self-governmental tasks. 
Further important elements of the decentralisation package have taken 
place more recently, e.g. in the education sector, in the services for disa-
bled people, in port, airport and road management (for details see Fonro-
jet, 2005: 17 ff; Kuhlmann et al., 2011). In 2010, the creation of unitary 
métropoles (Comité Balladur, 2009; Kuhlmann, 2010) and of a new type 
of unitary territorial councils (conseils territoriaux) was introduced through 
the integration of regional and département councils, whereas the respecti-
ve functions of regions and départements were separated more clearly. The 
new territorial councils will be directly elected in 2014. 
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4. The Effects of Decentralisation
By assessing the performance effects (input and output changes) of de-
centralisation on the one hand and system changes on the other, the fol-
lowing paragraphs correspond to steps two and three of the analytical 
framework. 
4.1. The Effects on the Performance
4.1.1. Input Changes
One of the easily observable effects of decentralisation is an enormous 
expansion of local resource expenditures (i.e. outlays, personnel) caused 
by the increase of responsibilities imparted on the local authorities. As a 
consequence of the transfer of state civil servants to sub-national levels of 
government and the recruitment of new staff, the number of public em-
ployees in local government doubled within twenty years. In comparison, 
the number of personnel employed by the central government administra-
tion grew by only 12 per cent between 1980 and 2003 (Table 1). Likewise, 
the public employment »density«, measured by the number of public em-
ployees per 1,000 inhabitants, at the local level (with an increase of 6 civil 
servants per 1,000 inhabitants since 1980) has clearly outpaced the incre-
ase in central government recruitment, which actually remained at two 
civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants between 1980 and 2003. Incredible 55 
per cent of the newly employed personnel between 1984 and 2004 were 
recruited by the local authorities (Richard, 2006: 2). Therefore, there is 
strong evidence to support the claim that the local level has developed at 
a much wider rate than the central government. 
As a result of the 1999 law (Loi Chevènement), which provided the legal 
foundation for significant strengthening of inter-municipal cooperation, 
the cooperation bodies (établissements publics à coopération intercommunale 
– EPCI) experienced an enormous increase in their personnel by roughly 
12 per cent in the period 2002 – 2003 alone (Kuhlmann, 2010). Pub-
lic employees working at the inter-municipal level represent over a tenth 
of the total number of local government employees (including regions 
and départements). The inter-municipal public employment has – statisti-
cally – »overtaken« regional government (0.7 per cent of the total number 
employed by the local government) and is catching up with the départe-
ments (16 per cent). Due to the expansion of responsibilities and tasks, 
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the revenue of local governments increased six fold over a twenty year 
period (from !32 billion in 1980 to !186 billion in 2005; INSEE, 2005). 
According to the reform agenda put forward by Sarkozy in 2007/08, fur-
ther strengthening of the inter-municipal cooperation bodies as major in-
stitutions for sub-national service provision can be expected, although the 
traditional principle of voluntary territorial amalgamation (volontariat) has 
been retained (Comité Balladur, 2009; Kuhlmann, 2010).
At first sight, the statistics seem to paint a rather rosy picture of the chan-
ges that occurred at the local level over the past twenty years. However, 
at a closer look, many critical cracks are visible in this portrait. Firstly, 
the majority of public servants are still employed by the central state. 
Opposed to 25 employees per 1,000 citizens in local government, the 
state administration is almost double that size, having 41 employees per 
1,000 citizens. Secondly, decentralisation has had neither a lasting nor 
significant effect on the number of employees in the numerous small and 
rural municipalities. This is apparent from the fact that more than 30,000 
local governments (54 per cent) employ less than five employees and only 
about 300 local governments (0.5 per cent) have more than 1,000 em-
ployees (Direction Générale des collectivités locales/DESL, 2006: 107). 































2,273 56.2 39.1 2,308 54.2 39.7 2,543 50.5 41.1 270 11.9 2.0
Local 
authorities*
1,021 26.4 18.4 1,166 27.4 20.1 1,522 30.3 24.6 501 49.1 6.2
Hospital 
sector





3,865 100 69.5 4,258 100 73.3 5,031 100.0 81.2 1,166 30.2 11.7
* Regions, départements, municipalities
Source: Direction Générale des collectivités locales/DESL 2006, Observatoire de l’emploi public, DGAFP 
2005 and author’s calculations. 
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In 2 per cent of the French local municipalities (758 cases), there is no 
administrative staff at all. Decentralisation has thus not led to a straight-
forward balancing of resource distribution in France. It has rather tended 
to strengthen the disparities already present in France of »two speeds« 
(France à deux vitesses). While a small number of larger cities, where the 
majority of the French population lives, prosper in their administrative 
and functional responsibilities, the smaller and more rural municipalities 
that encompass only a small minority of the entire population remain un-
touched by decentralisation movements. 
Despite these imbalances in resource allocation and development, it be-
comes apparent that the central government’s reform concept, which em-
phasises cost savings without infringement of the quality of service de-
livery (faire mieux avec moins), has yet to take effect. If one measures the 
success of decentralisation by »input« savings, then conclusions to the 
contrary can be drawn. The increase of resources, especially in the rate of 
recruitment and local public employment, could be a case of doing more 
by using more (faire mieux avec plus). Critics of the movement argue that 
decentralisation has not only made public action in France less transpa-
rent and more complicated, but that it has also increased the costs by a 
considerable amount. 
 »... la décentralisation n’a abouti qu’à la constitution d’un sys-
tæme semi-centralisé ... et probablement plus couteux qu’on ne le 
croit« (Balligand and Zeller, 2006: 8). 
 »... decentralization has only lead to the creation of a semi-cen-
tralised system ... and one that is probably more costly than we 
believed it to be.«
 »Le nombre élevé de nos échelons d’administration locale entraîne 
des surcoùts qu’il faut maîtriser« (Richard, 2006: 2).
 »The increased number of our echelons in local administration 
leads to additional costs that must be controlled.«
Another reason for failed efficiency gains can be found in the strong in-
stitutional weight of the state administration. Against this, the recent 
Sarkozy-reforms (révision générale des politiques publiques – RGPP) launched 
in 2007/08 envisage streamlining of the state administration in order to 
save money and to achieve significant cost reductions. An example of 
this strategy of cutting back resources and downsizing state offices is the 
creation of a new tax administration (direction générale des finances pub-
liques – DGFiP) in 2008 by fusing two previously separate big state of-
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fices and reducing their personnel by 10 per cent, which is expected to 
produce the savings of roughly !225 million in 2011 (DGFiP, 2008).
4.1.2. Output Changes
Local government expenditures can give a useful insight into the output 
changes because they reflect the range and scope of duties carried out 
by the local governments. Thus, they are a reliable indicator of whether 
decentralisation has made a substantial impact on the amount of local 
public services. Since the 1980s, local government expenditures have in-
creased enormously, by almost 50 per cent between 1985 and 1990 alone, 
which can be compared to the total increase in public expenditure during 
this same period that amounted to approximately 30 per cent. Since local 
expenditures roughly quintupled from 1980 to 2005, it is obvious that the 
local authorities in France have dramatically increased their functional 
value. This is true in both absolute and, when compared to the other 
governmental levels, relative terms. Another indicator of the increased 
functional responsibilities can be seen in the figures that show the local 
authorities’ enlarged share of the gross domestic product from 8.5 per 
cent (1982) to 11 per cent (2005)5 and their share in total public spending 
which has meanwhile grown from 16 per cent (1985) to more than 20 per 
cent. The increased number of tasks and responsibilities discharged by 
local governments has also led to significant changes in administrative or-
ganisation and personnel (Borraz, 1998). The level of professionalism and 
specialisation as well as the number of local government professions and 
functionally specialised administrative units increased as a result of the 
enlarged scope of responsibilities and a higher degree of internal organi-
sational differentiation. The range of professional positions and available 
career paths in the local government, which demand a formal qualifica-
tion along with the necessary concour, has grown accordingly. At the time 
of writing, there are ten municipal career paths (filiæres) and each has its 
own programme of study and legal prescriptions in addition to a total of 
59 professional municipal groups, each of which has between two and five 
grades of employment (Kuhlmann and Bogumil, 2007). The organisational 
changes in service delivery since the 1980s are far from negligible, and 
public, private and mixed forms of local service production and provision 
are being increasingly merged together. As a result, local government is 
5  The central government’s proportion of gross domestic product increased, but in 
comparison more moderately (by 1.4% 1982–2005). Richard, 2006: 2.
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being reshaped into a far more varied »structure of governance« (Kuhl-
mann and Fedele, 2010).
According to the research, decentralisation in France has undoubtedly led 
to a larger and more diverse service portfolio for the municipalities and 
départements. Since Acte I, the push within municipal government to take 
on more responsibility in planning is a prime example of this movement. 
Accordingly, the number of land-use plans has more than doubled since 
the 1980s (from 6,764 to 15,500; Jacquot and Priet, 2004). As a conse-
quence, over one half of the French municipalities have plans that have 
effect on approximately 50 per cent of the total French territory and on 
three-quarters of the population. However, when considering administra-
tive performance in urban planning and development, it is important to 
differentiate the larger and averaged sized cities (50,000 inhabitants and 
more) from the smaller municipalities, which represent by far the majority 
of French local governments. While the larger cities with over 50,000 in-
habitants are in the position to manage planning with a more professional 
and well-trained administrative staff and are thus capable of taking on 
an autonomous role in urban planning and development (Mouton, 1994: 
141), smaller municipalities remain dependent on the (initially free) as-
sistance of the state administration (direction départementale d’équipement 
– DDE). Only in the wake of an »inter-municipal revolution« (Borraz and 
Le Galæs, 2005; Kuhlmann, 2010) was it possible to make the changes 
in the traditional »symbiosis« between the rural municipalities and the 
de-concentrated field offices of the central state.6 The laws on inter-mu-
nicipal cooperation (the 1999 Loi Chevænement) and on urban develop-
ment (the 2000 Loi SRU) transferred wider responsibilities for land-use 
planning to the inter-municipal level, which therefore tends to replace the 
individual municipalities (as well as the field offices of the central state) 
as planning and development actors. Consequently, the »single purpose« 
state administration, which has until now operated at the grassroots level, 
could turn out to be redundant. This has already been confirmed by the 
recent fusion of the time-honoured State Offices for Infrastructure (direc-
tions départementales d’équipement – DDE) with the Offices for Agriculture 
and Forests (directions départementales de l’agriculture et de la forèt – DDAF) 
in the course of the aforementioned new reform agenda (RGPP). Thus, a 
6  In 2004, 82 per cent of the total population and 86 per cent of all municipalities in 
France were covered by inter-municipal communities (EPCI) with their own tax revenues. 
The »coverage« in some of the leading regions for decentralization, is currently conducted 
by nearly all the communes. Kuhlmann 2009a: 91 with further references.
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new state administration of the territories has been established (direction 
départementale des territoires). 
As a consequence of decentralisation, départments have become increas-
ingly restricted to carrying out local welfare policies and being predomi-
nantly responsible for »social action« (action sociale). One concern is that 
the multi-purpose portfolio of the départements will be reduced to the 
large social assistance agencies (transformer les départements en vastes bu-
reaux d’aide sociale, Portier, 2003: 64), which will be responsible for the 
tasks delgated to them by the state, and will simultaneously lose political 
autonomy in deciding on their »own« self-administrative functions and 
voluntary tasks. In fact, a large part of the tasks performed by the départe-
ments are related to social policy, and according to the complaints of the 
local authorities, the increase in the volume of tasks, especially those in 
the social policy area, does not correspond to the available resources. This 
negative feedback to the financial overburdening through Acte II is wide-
spread among the general councils despite the state compensations paid 
by the national government in order to absorb outstanding costs. These 
compensations amounted to !11.5 billion (!3 billion for the regions, !8 
billion for the départements). Yet, local authorities have already appealed 
for increased compensation, arguing that current payments will not cover 
the extra costs of the départements. Moreover, since the 1990s, financial 
autonomy of the local governments has become severely restricted. Above 
all, in the smaller, economically weaker and socially more problematic 
départements this development has entailed some precarious consequen-
ces. In the social welfare boards at the département level, for example, the 
criteria for approving transfer payments to longterm unemployed indi-
viduals (RMI) have been made tighter, and the granting of payments has 
become more restricted. The case studies have revealed that decentralisa-
tion of the RMI-responsibilities has had different effects on départements 
depending on the latter’s resources and economic position. Underlying 
disparities and financial inequalities have been sharpened by these deve-
lopments (Kuhlmann et al., 2011).
Regarding the changes in the quality of service delivery; on the one hand, 
there is a clear trend towards a more direct contact with citizens and prob-
lem areas, a more professional local service, and better responsiveness 
on the side of the local government. As a result of the transfer of respon-
sibilities in the area of »social action«, local administrative organisation 
has been re-structured and modernised. In some départements new »ter-
ritorial« units (unités territoriales d’action sociale – UTAS) have been built 
up with the idea of closer contact and better availability to the public. As 
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such, many of the social services have been territorially de-concentrated 
and bundled together into one-stop-agencies. On the other hand, the stra-
tegy of »territorialisation« at the départements level can be seen as further 
support to and confirmation of the largely criticised tendency of an »over-
institutionalisation« and »institutional thickness« that is characteristic for 
the French sub-national landscape (see section »system effects« below 
for further reference). As shown on the example of public transport, the 
effects of this development are sometimes rather customer-unfriendly. In 
the city of Rouen, responsibilities for public transport are divided between 
the city itself (responsible for inner-city bus service), the agglomeration 
Communauté d’Agglomération de Rouen – CAR (responsible for under-
ground transport and some bus routes), and the département Seine-Mari-
time (responsible for bus routes outside of the town). This fragmentation 
of responsibilities within one policy area consequently lies at the expense 
of citizens as service consumers. 
4.2. System changes
There are many diverse perspectives in the literature whether decentrali-
sation policies have led to a system change in France and if yes, to what 
extent or they have led merely to some incremental adjustments. A unani-
mous answer has not been found yet.7 The following chapter concentrates 
on the coordination of sub-national tasks, focusing on three aspects: (1) 
multi-purpose vs. single purpose coordination; (2) separation vs. fusion of 
state and local tasks; (3) steering by hierarchy vs. steering by contract.
4.2.1. From single-purpose to multi-purpose coordination?
Decentralisation policies are directed at strengthening the multi-purpose 
portfolio of the localities, while weakening the position of single-purpose 
state offices in the territory. There is no doubt that the bigger cities and 
urban agglomerations have meanwhile developed their position as mul-
ti-purpose service providers to such an extent that they are no longer in 
need of the central government’s administrative assistance. Additionally, 
7  »In administrative terms, the French model remains one of the most centralized in 
the world« (Hoffmann-Martinot, 2003: 159). This perspective can be considered in contrast 
to: »Over the past 20 years France has moved from one of the most centralized systems in 
Europe to one of the most decentralized« (OECD, 2003:  71).
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in policy areas such as urban planning or local welfare, they also provide 
a testing ground for policy innovations and new modes of governance, 
which are then partly adopted by the national legislature. 
Even in the French peripheries inter-municipal cooperation has enhanced 
and fuelled a movement that has increasingly led to a more functionally 
and territorially viable role of local self-government. As a result of the »in-
ter-municipal revolution« (Borraz and Le Galæs, 2005; Kuhlmann, 2010), 
which appears to mark the end of an era of failed territorial reforms, the 
EPCI could prove themselves to be the dominant level of service provi-
sion within the French local government system. The process of decen-
tralisation and »inter-municipal cooperation« thus had a significant part 
to play in the transformation of the traditionally weak functional role of 
the French local government system to an increasingly multi-purpose and 
solid model, in which particularly the départements and cities as well as the 
inter-municipal cooperation bodies enjoy increased administrative stren-
gth, resources, and functional responsibilities.
Notwithstanding this remarkable shift from single-purpose to multi-pur-
pose coordination of public task fulfilment, the French »executive centra-
lism« shows an incredible institutional inertia. This is highlighted by the 
fact that 50 per cent of total public employment in France encompasses 
central government civil servants (Fonction Publique d’Etat – FPE), of which 
95 per cent serve outside the Parisian ministries in de-concentrated  field 
offices (services extérieurs; Thoenig, 2005: 689). Thus, the single-purpose 
logic of locally operating de-concentrated state offices that are competent 
for specialised tasks remains in force – despite decentralisation and an 
increasingly multi-purpose local government. It remains to be seen, howe-
ver, whether the RGPP-reforms launched by Sarkozy will mark a critical 
juncture in this historically inherited institutional path.
4.2.2. Separation or fusion of state and local tasks?
The central-local task separation or fusion is yet another relevant dimen-
sion for assessing the system change. The decentralisation movement 
entailed a growing complexity and intertwining of administrative levels 
and an increasing institutional competition between various bureaucratic 
organisations at the sub-national level. This can be explained by the fact 
that the initially envisaged transfer of separate fields of competence (blocs 
de compétences), which would be clearly divided between de-concentrated 
state offices and local authorities on the one hand and the different sub-
national government bodies on the other, never came into existence. On 
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the contrary, the different sub-national levels of government as well as the 
de-concentrated field offices of the central state each have access to all 
locally relevant policy fields. Against this background, the possibility of 
replacing the »fused system« of competences with a system based on a 
vertically divided model that clearly separates the tasks between the cen-
tral state and local authorities (»separational system«) is not likely in the 
foreseeable future. Even the attempts made through Acte II to reduce the 
many forms of co-management and co-finance in order to define the com-
petences between the levels of government more clearly had only limi-
ted success. Still, the majority of local policy areas, including the »Social 
Action« programme, are characterised by multi-level institutional arran-
gements, mixed finances8 and multi-actor settings (Balligand and Zeller, 
2006: 8). Furthermore, the cities tend to define and implement policies 
outside their legally assigned competences without being punished by the 
supervisory authorities. Accordingly, they can influence policy areas that 
are, legally speaking, not in their jurisdiction.9 The actual influence and 
power local governments are able to acquire through the described lack of 
clarity and transparency in the distribution of tasks between the various 
levels of government is remarkable on the one hand (Thoenig, 2005: 690). 
On the other hand, this structure has had negative impacts on democra-
tic accountability, institutional transparency and political control, all of 
which has been criticised by some observers as deliberate political irres-
ponsibility (déresponsabilisation). In other words, it gives political actors 
the opportunity to be less personally responsible for local policy outcomes 
(Richard, 2006: 3).
The growing problem of political accountability is in part a consequence 
of the constitutional discrimination of the functionally prospering inter-
municipal level of government that can be considered a real lacuna of 
the Acte II legislation (see above). The EPCI have retained the legal sta-
tus of public agencies (établissements publics) and thus remained without 
the status of a fully-fledged local authority (collectivité locale). Contrary to 
»normal« local governments, the representatives of the inter-municipal 
councils (conseil communautaire) are only indirectly elected (through the 
councillors of the member-municipalities). They are thus often referred to 
8  As such large parts of the regional budgets (in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Li-
mousin on average two-thirds respectively) are reserved for co-financed projects (Gilbert 
and Thoenig, 1999). In the 1990s, the French regional councils co-financed 1,300 projects.
9  The city of Le Havre, which founded its own university, offers a clear example of 
this trend.
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as »second degree councillors« (élus du deuxiæme degré, Guéranger, 2004: 
6).10 Given that the inter-municipal administrations have fiscal sovereign-
ty to levy their own taxes and that they discharge an increasingly broad 
spectrum of duties, debates regarding legitimacy and democratic control 
of this level of sub-national government play a decisively large role on the 
political agenda. The reform proposals put forward by the Comité Balla-
dur in 2009 could contribute to remedy this problem – at least to some 
extent.
Due to the fact that the idea of systematically dismantling de-concentra-
ted state administration and of introducing a hierarchical order between 
the several levels of sub-national governments was abandoned, the scale 
and intensity of institutional entanglement and vertical integration incre-
ased substantially. Locally operating field offices of the central state (ser-
vices extérieurs) are less able to mark their territory and are increasingly 
often forced to cooperate with local authorities and new actors such as 
the inter-municipal councils, numerous quasi-autonomous and »para-mu-
nicipal« bodies, and private service providers. In the policy field of urban 
planning and development there are, in extreme cases, up to nine sub-
national authorities acting in a single local government jurisdiction (Tho-
enig, 2005: 688). As a consequence, the distribution of competences has 
become more fragmented, less transparent, and less coordinated, as there 
is a tendency to overlap tasks, which creates competing responsibilities. 
The local level of government is plagued by institutional thickness and 
over-institutionalisation, both of which result in a situation where coordi-
nation, decision-making and policy implementation are only possible with 
high costs and require a large amount of time and effort.
4.2.3. From Hierarchy to Partnerships and Contracts? 
One of the clear outcomes of decentralisation policy is the fact that a form 
of negotiation based on decision-making and bargaining has taken the 
place of a traditionally centralised-hierarchical organisation in which the 
government (at least formally) had the upper hand in dictating policy. On 
10  To the present day, the president of an EPCI is usually the mayor of the largest 
member-municipality and his formal election follows in accordance with a previous informal 
agreement between the municipalities concerned. The inter-municipal executive is insti-
tutionally supported by an inter-municipal administration (administration communautaire), 
whose size and personnel weight vary according to the population of member-municipalities 
and the range of tasks assigned.
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the one hand, local authorities have gained in importance as institutional 
actors, and service providers have become increasingly independent of the 
central state assistance. On the other hand, the central government has 
failed to withdraw itself from the local institutional sphere. While rema-
ining institutionally present at the local level and administratively active 
throughout the country at the grassroots level (Thoenig, 2005: 689), the 
state actors have notably lost the power to influence concrete local af-
fairs and actual political processes at the local level (Borraz and Le Galès, 
2005: 21). As the locally operating state offices experienced de facto lo-
sses in functional influence, the power relationship between cities/agglo-
merations and central government actors partly reversed. The latter have 
thus become more dependent on being included into local projects and 
activities, which has provided them with a raison d’ètre. The justification 
of their position increasingly relies on their capability to create and deve-
lop state-local partnerships (partenariat). These cooperative arrangements 
and partnerships provide an appropriate forum for local executives to get 
immediate access to and influence on important decision-making actors 
and processes at higher levels of government. State civil servants from their 
corresponding fields of expertise thus render an important »service« to 
the municipal executives as leasers, brokers and speakers of local interests, 
and as such allow a bottom up territorial influence to take effect on higher 
decision-making levels. Moreover, from the perspective of the mayors and 
general/regional council presidents, technical and administrative guidance 
from the de-concentrated field offices of the state provides more than just 
politically neutral expertise in the areas that would otherwise be subject to 
local political debate and would succumb to inter-local institutional com-
petition. Indeed, the deliberate inclusion of prefects in the local policy 
processes (whose control over local authorities’ decision-making is legally 
reduced to a posteriori control) allows the mayors to act more indepen-
dently from other competing local authorities such as the general council, 
larger cities or even regions.11 The rapidly decreasing functional role of de-
concentrated field offices of the central state and the parallel expansion 
in resources and institutional equipment at the local level has allowed the 
cities’ executives to gain an even more powerful position than the prefects 
and heads of locally operating field offices of the central state.
11  This is illustrated by various examples of contract policies in »urban planning and 
development« (contrats de ville), which led to strategic coalitions between central govern-
ment and municipal actors against regional authorities (for example, Lille).
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»One of the key consequences is that the mayor or the president of a 
territorial council becomes a much stronger actor than before within his 
own territorial jurisdiction, stronger even than the prefect and the state 
representatives« (Thoenig, 2005: 700). 
Consequently, the need for compromise and negotiation between the 
various actors and levels of government has risen significantly. Local po-
licy-making today is dependent on either the success or failure of bar-
gaining and contracting between the central and local actors as well as 
between the various »players« at the sub-national level of government. 
Therefore, contract management (contractualisation), partnerships (parte-
nariat) and other instruments of non-hierarchical, horizontal governance 
have been implemented in order to address the severe problems of control 
and coordination within this highly fragmented and over-institutionalised 
decision-making system. The policy of urban planning and development 
(politique de la ville) provides a good example for this inter-governmental 
negotiation necessity. Politique de la ville is considered the classical area 
for local contract policy and it has been viewed by many local actors as ha-
ving failed to produce effective policy outcomes within reasonable time. 
Indeed, it is criticised as having helped to lengthen the duration of decisi-
on-making processes and to decrease the efficiency of task fulfilment due 
to complicated negotiations and multi-level contract procedures. 
»Do you know that with all the laws, criteria, and complicated funding 
rules I need much more time to prepare a project. ... I have to send an ever 
increasing amount of officials to meetings in order for them to negotiate 
with other municipalities and other partners and to deal with funding 
issues, etc. Here, for example, I have a project with ten financiers, ten! ... 
It’s incredibly complicated. One loses so much time ... With all the projects 
that I am currently in charge of, everybody is co-financed by everybody. 
There we have the problems of urban policy« (Directeur Général Adjoint 
»Famille et Politique de la Ville«, Rouen, Interview, 7. 4. 2005). 
5.  Conclusion: impacts of decentralisation – a 
transformation of the Jacobin state?
The aim of this paper is to assess the effects and impacts of decentralisa-
tion in France and thus fill in a research lacuna existing in public admini-
stration because empirical knowledge about the actual changes in the 
functioning of local institutions and their performances has been difficult 
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to obtain. Drawing on the analytical distinction between performance 
changes (input and output changes) and system changes (coordination in 
the intergovernmental system), the following can be concluded: 
Concerning the changes in inputs (costs, resources, employment), what 
has been observable is an enormous expansion of local government out-
lays and personnel that caused by their increased responsibilities. More 
recently, the inter-municipal cooperation bodies (EPCI) have experi-
enced a particular increase in their personnel and expenditures due to 
their widened task portfolio. Yet, the central state and its numerous de-
concentrated field offices continue to be the predominant level of public 
employment in France. Furthermore, the problem of France ! deux vitesses 
has been reinforced further because few larger cities prosper in terms of 
public employment and resources, whereas the myriad of rural munici-
palities remain an administrative wasteland. All in all, the reform concept 
of achieving cost savings without infringing on service delivery (faire mieux 
avec moins) has yet to become a reality. However, it is also due to the last-
ing institutional presence of (functionally hollowed out) de-concentrated 
state administrations next to local governments (so called dualisme). It 
remains to be seen, however, whether the more recent Sarkozy-reforms 
that are directed at fusing or even abolishing the state offices in the field 
will mark a rupture with the costly administrative dualism. 
With regard to output changes, local government expenditures, which can 
be used as a relevant indicator of the quantity of local governments’ servi-
ce production, have increased enormously during the last decades. Along 
with other more general economic and social developments, this is also 
a consequence of decentralisation policy in France. Due to the increased 
number of responsibilities discharged by local governments, the adminis-
trative organisation has been modernised and the level of professionalism 
and specialisation within local administrative units increased significantly. 
Service and customer-orientation have been enhanced – as indicators of 
the quality of service delivery – and local planning activities have been 
intensified. Yet, again, administrative output-performance depends on lo-
cal governments’ size and viability. Whereas larger cities are in the posi-
tion to manage important local tasks with more professional staff, smaller 
municipalities remain dependent on the assistance of the de-concentrated 
state administration. Only the future will show whether the strengthening 
of inter-municipal cooperation in combination with the abolishment or 
reduction of de-concentrated field offices of the central state will lead to 
a real break in this traditional symbiosis between the rural municipalities 
and the »territorialised« state. 
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Finally and importantly, there is the question of system changes. With 
respect to the changes in the French multi-level system that are revealed 
in this paper, is it possible to speak of a transformation or even of an end 
of the indivisible Republic? On the one hand, it is true that even before 
the process of decentralisation began there had been informal structures 
of negotiation, partnership-based decision-making, and non-hierarchical 
inter-governmental relations. These taken together can be seen as visi-
ble signs of the »tamed jacobinism«. On the other hand, an important 
outcome of decentralisation is that these patterns of coordination have 
become more generalised and the number of actors with de facto veto 
power in the multi-level system increased. There has emerged an adminis-
trative model in which the actors can come to policy solutions only if they 
coordinate and bundle the resources of different institutional levels and 
functional jurisdictions in a convoluted system of contract politics (con-
tractualisation) and concerted action (concertation). This generalised form 
of contracting, concerted action and multi-level negotiation stands in the 
way of a more effective, efficient and immediate local policy making.
Searching for a conclusion as to whether France faces the end of the in-
divisible republic, one possible place to end could be with the argument 
of Hoffmann-Martinot (2003): one, yet divisible. Legally, the unity of the 
nation (Etat-Nation) continues to be in force. Nevertheless, with the pro-
cess of decentralisation, the power of the central state has been severely 
cut, with the latter experiencing weakening in its functional influences 
at the sub-national levels of government. The principles of territoriality 
and of multi-purpose coordination at the sub-national level of govern-
ment have gained in importance and the legitimacy of inter-local vari-
ance has been reaffirmed. The institutional variability at the local level has 
been increased and local authorities have gained more autonomy. That 
resulted in growing inter-local differences and even disparities, which con-
spicuously contradicts the traditional principle of égalité. Although France 
continues to retain its formal characteristic of a unitary state, the actual 
system of multi-level governance increasingly acquires the properties (and 
steering problems) of a semi-sovereign state (Katzenstein, 1987). This is 
shown by the inter-governmental joint decision-making structures as well 
as by the remarkable de facto influence of sub-national players on the 
national policy-making process and on the regional variability of policy 
implementation (Kuhlmann et al., 2011). Thus, despite the constitutional 
prevalence of an indivisible state, the decentralised republic acts de facto 
as a fairly divisible system with strengthened local actors and an increas-
ingly differentiated sub-national polity.
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DECENTRALISATION IN FRANCE: 
THE »JACOBIN« STATE STUCK BETWEEN CONTINUITY 
AND TRANSFORMATION
Summary
France has traditionally been regarded as having one of the most centralised 
public administrations in the world. The consequences of decentralisation at the 
local level in France (départements, communes) are analysed and contrasted 
with the pursued reform objectives. After a brief review of the most important 
characteristics of the »tamed Jacobinism«, the motives, political debates, and ex-
pectations associated with the reforms and their major elements are extrapolated 
upon by concentrating on the second round of decentralisation, which began in 
2003 (Acte II). The impacts and effects of decentralisation are scrutinised by 
distinguishing between operational results and far-reaching system effects. In 
order to reveal the former, it is asked if the objective of the French government, 
faire mieux avec moins (doing better with less), has been obtained. Exploring 
the latter, the changes in the system with regard to vertical power sharing, coor-
dination practices between local and state actors, and actual decision-making 
in an intergovernmental setting are analysed. 
Key words: decentralisation – France, »Jacobin« state, local government, state 
and administrative reform, vertical power sharing, better with less
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DECENTRALIZACIJA U FRANCUSKOJ: 
JAKOBINSKA DR!AVA IZME"U KONTINUITETA 
I TRANSFORMACIJE
Sa#etak
Za Francusku se tradicionalno smatra da ima jednu od najcentraliziranijih 
javnih uprava na svijetu. Analiziraju se posljedice decentralizacije na lokalnoj 
razini u Francuskoj (departmani, op!ine) te uspore$uju s ciljevima reforme. 
Nakon kratkog pregleda najva#nijih zna%ajki »pripitomljenog jakobinizma«, 
izla#u se motivi, politi%ke rasprave te o%ekivanja povezana s reformama i nji-
hovim glavnim elementima, s naglaskom na drugi krug decentralizacije koji je 
zapo%eo 2003. (Acte II). Analiziraju se u%inci i posljedice decentralizacije %i-
njenjem razlike izme$u operativnih rezultata i dalekose#nijih sistemskih u%ina-
ka. Kako bi se u%inilo prvo, postavlja se pitanje je li cilj francuske vlade u%initi 
vi&e s manje sredstava (faire mieux avec moins) doista postignut. Pri analizi 
potonjeg, ra&%lanjuju se promjene u sustavu s obzirom na vertikalnu diobu vlasti, 
koordinacijsku praksu lokalnih i dr#avnih aktera te na stvarni proces odlu%iva-
nja u okru#ju isprepletenosti razli%itih razina vlasti.
Klju"ne rije"i: decentralizacija – Francuska, »jakobinska« dr#ava, lokalna 
vlast, dr#avna i upravna reforma, vertikalna dioba vlasti, %initi vi&e s manje
HJU-2011-2-Book.indb   336 6.7.2011   12:41:29
